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THE ENFORCEABILITY OF ARBITRATION CLAUSES IN
VIRGINIA MARITAL SEPARATION AGREEMENTS
Arbitration, a widely utilized method for resolving commercial and la-
bor disagreements, has become an increasingly accepted means of settling
domestic disputes that arise under separation or divorce agreements.1
The number of judicial decisions reviewing clauses in divorce and separa-
tion agreements which provide for the arbitration of disputes involving
spousal support payments, child support and custody matters, has more
than doubled since 1950.2 In a number of jurisdictions, courts have con-
sistently enforced arbitration clauses to settle matrimonial disputes.3 At-
torneys are more frequently drafting separation agreements which con-
1. Coalson, Family Arbitration-An Exercise in Sensitivity, 3 FM. L.Q. 22, 22 (1969).
Inter-spousal agreements formed before marriage are "antenuptial," those formed during
marital harmony are "postnuptial," and those formed in contemplation of or during separa-
tion are separation agreements. 1 A. LINDEY, SEPARATION AREEMENTS AND ANTENUPrIAL
CoNTRAcTs § 3, at 3-6 to -7 (1978).
2. Annot., 18 A.L.R.3d 1264, 1266 (1968). States which have considered the use of arbi-
tration in domestic cases include California, Delaware, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Massa-
chusetts, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina and Tennessee. See id. at 1264. The Amer-
ican Arbitration Association (AAA) has convened a special committee to study the need for
more accessible and inexpensive means for dispute resolution. This committee recently con-
cluded a study on alternatives to formal litigation and reviewed a number of states whose
legislatures had made significant progress in formulating dispute resolution laws. The report
briefly analyzes passed or pending legislation in California, Colorado, Connecticut, Dela-
ware, Florida, Michigan, Minnesota, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma and Texas. L.
FREEDMAN & L. RAY, STATE LEGISLATION ON DISPUTE REsOLUTION 1 (ABA Special Committee
on Alternative Dispute Resolution, Monograph Series No. 1 1982). The study found that, as
of 1982, 188 communities in 38 states have established neighborhood and citizen oriented
dispute centers. Further, the study found that there were over four hundred private agen-
cies and city governmental entities designed to resolve problems by providing informal
processes instead of formal litigation. Id. at "forward." For information on over one hundred
of these dispute resolution programs (such as types of cases, funding sources, annual
caseloads, staff and training) see SPECALL COMMrrEE ON ALTERNAT DisPUTE RESOLUTION,
A-BA DisPUTE RESOLUTION PROGRAM DIRECTORY (L. Ray ed. 1982).
3. See generally Annot., 18 A.L.R.3d 1264 (1968). Provisions for the arbitration of dis-
putes governing spousal and child support payments have generally been upheld. See, e.g.,
Faherty v. Faherty, 97 N.J. 99, 477 A.2d 1257 (1984). However, cases which have examined
provisions for the arbitration of disputes involving child custody or visitation rights are
split. Compare Crutchley v. Crutchley, 306 N.C. 518, 293 S.E.2d 793 (1982) (parties may
settle custody issues by arbitration, although the decisions are reviewable by the court) and
Sheets v. Sheets, 22 A.D.2d 176, 254 N.Y.S.2d 320 (1964) (agreement to submit issue of
child custody to arbitration held valid and enforceable) with Nestel v. Nestel, 38 A.D.2d
942, _, 331 N.Y.S.2d 241, 243 (1972) (agreements to arbitrate custody and visitation of
minor children is inappropriate; "the judicial process is more broadly gauged and better
suited" to protect the children's best interests).
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tain arbitration clauses,4 and the American Arbitration Association has
promulgated a variety of rules and procedures specifically designed to
deal with such agreements.5 However, Virginia courts have yet to decide
whether arbitration clauses in separation agreements are judicially en-
forceable under the Virginia arbitration statutes.6
Arbitration is one of a growing array of marital dispute resolution alter-
natives7 which are increasingly utilized by the public and advocated as
worthy alternatives to the courtroom." However, there is a continued con-
4. See generally Coalson, supra note 1; Comment, The Enforceability of Arbitration
Clauses in North Carolina Separation Agreements, 15 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 487, 487
(1979).
5. See Spencer & Zammit, Reflections on Arbitration Under the Family Dispute Ser-
vices, 32 AR. J. 111 (1977). In 1976 the American Arbitration Association promulgated a
series of rules and procedures designed to specifically deal with the resolution of marital
disputes. The Association drafted a model arbitration clause:
Any controversy arising out of or relating to this agreement or the breach thereof,
shall be settled in accordance with the rules of the American Arbitration Association.
Both parties agree to abide by the terms of the award rendered by the arbitrator[s]
and judgment upon the award may be entered in any court having jurisdiction
thereof.
AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, FAMILY DisPuTE SERVICES 305 (1977).
The AAA is a non-profit organization, and while it does not act as an arbitrator, it pro-
vides services and facilities for arbitration. The AAA is basically an administrative agency,
with services including providing lists from which arbitrators may be selected, as well as
supplying administrative personnel and procedures for cases being arbitrated under its
rules. F. ELKOuI & EA. ELKOURI, How ARBITRATION WORKS 25 (3rd ed. 1973) [hereinafter
cited as ELKOURI].
6. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-577 to -581 (Repl. Vol. 1984).
7. Phear, Family Mediation: A Choice of Options, 39 ARB. J. 23 (1984). Other options to
adjudication include mediation, negotiation and conciliation. Negotiation has long been used
by divorcing spouses and their counsel, while mediation and conciliation are becoming in-
creasingly used. See generally VIRGINIA LAW FOUNDATION, SECOND ANNUAL FAMILY LAW SEM-
INAR: AVOIDING LITIGATION IN DIVORCE SETTLEMENTS-RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN FAMILY LAW
(1983).
Conciliation is an informal process which involves a very limited role for the conciliator.
Generally, the conciliator's main role is simply to facilitate discussions and negotiations be-
tween the parties. He or she is,- theoretically, not supposed to take an active role in the
discourse between the parties, but merely to serve as a "go-between" who provides a place
and time for negotiations to occur. See Phear, supra, at 23-24.
Mediation is a third party intervention strategy in which the mediator actively partici-
pates in the identification, clarification and resolution of controversies between disputing
parties. By definition, mediators do not have the coercive powers of an arbitrator. Rather,
they must rely on the mutual agreement of the "disputants" to continue their mediation
sessions and to come to a resolution of the controversy. Id. For a comparision between medi-
ation and arbitration, see Meroney, Mediation and Arbitration of Separation and Divorce
Agreements, 15 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 467 (1979).
8. See Broderick, Compulsory Arbitration: One Better Way, 69 A.BA J. 64 (1983) (an
arbitration program can provide litigants with a less expensive and more expedient alterna-
tive for the resolution of their disputes than the courtroom); Coalson, supra note 1, at 22-24;
Phear, supra note 7, at 23; Comment, supra note 4, at 487.
There are basically three types of arbitration: (1) the single arbitrator, (2) an impartial
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troversy over whether public policy will permit divorcing spouses to re-
solve all aspects of their disputes through arbitration 9-particularly dis-
putes involving child support, custody and visitation. Several jurisdictions
have addressed this debate, and have formulated various responses re-
garding the enforceability of arbitration agreements between divorcing
spouses.10
This comment will analyze Virginia cases and statutory law, and com-
pare the relevant Virginia authority to the positions adopted by the other
jurisdictions. By considering Virginia law, examining the public policy ar-
guments, and integrating the positions adopted in other jurisdictions, this
comment seeks to formulate the likely Virginia response to the enforce-
ment of arbitration clauses in marital separation agreements.
I. BACKGROUND: ARBITRATION AS A SUBSTITUTE FOR THE COURTROOM
A. An Overview of Arbitration
An agreement to arbitrate generally consists of a contract between the
parties to submit their dispute to an arbitrator, and a grant of power
from each side authorizing the arbitrator to act on their behalf to resolve
the conflict." At common law there was no right of arbitration, and if a
dispute was to be submitted for arbitration it usually had to be pursuant
to a statute. 2
tri-partite board appointed by an independent agency such as the AAA, and (3) a tri-partite
board where each party appoints a designee and the two designees, or an outside party,
appoint the third. A. LINDEY, supra note 1, § 29, at 29-1 to -2.
9. Sterk, Enforceability of Agreements to Arbitrate: An Examination of the Public Pol-
icy Defense, 2 CARDozo L. REV. 481 (1981) (the goals of arbitration may be overridden by
paramount state and public interests).
10. See supra note 3.
11. For the specific prerequisites for an agreement to arbitrate in Virginia, see VA. CODE
ANN. § 8.01-577 (Repl. Vol. 1984). For a more detailed analysis of the history of arbitration
in Virginia see Daughtrey, Enforceability of Agreements to Arbitrate: It's Time to Review
Virginia Law, 10 VA. B.AJ. No. 3, at 15 (1983). For an authoritative analysis of the entire
arbitration process see ELKOURI, supra note 5.
Although disputing parties may pick an arbitrator any way they wish (depending upon
their arbitration agreement), many utilize the American Arbitration Association. The AAA
has over 60,000 arbitrators on its roster-many of these arbitrators are specialists in a par-
ticular field or science. After the disputants contact the AAA, the Association will normally
send the parties a list of possible choice. Each party then indicates which arbitrators are
preferred, and the AAA selects a mutually acceptable arbitrator. Meyerwetz, The Arbitra-
tion Alternative, 71 A.BA J. 78, 79 (1985).
12. Parsons v. Norfolk & W. Ry., 310 F. Supp. 1197, 1201 (S.D. W. Va. 1970), af'd, 442
F.2d 1075 (4th Cir. 1971). The relevant Virginia statutes are VA. CODE ANN. §§ 8.01-577 to
-581 (Repl. Vol. 1984).
The following is a general list of provisions common to many of the more "modem" arbi-
tration statutes around the country.
1. Agreements to arbitrate existing and future disputes are made valid and
enforceable.
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As a general rule, agreements which make arbitration the means of
resolving all future disputes between parties are contrary to public policy
because such agreements attempt to deprive the courts of their jurisdic-
tion. 13 While a private agreement cannot oust the courts of their jurisdic-
tion, parties may lawfully make arbitration a condition precedent to a
right of action upon a contract.1 4 Virginia has enacted a statute which
recognizes that the submission of any claim or controversy to arbitration
may be made a prerequisite to a suit on a contract.' 5
Since parties normally voluntarily abide by their agreements to arbi-
trate, courts usually do not need to force adherence to arbitration provi-
sions." Judicial review is normally sought only under two circumstances:
2. Courts are given jurisdiction to compel arbitration, or to stay arbitration if no
agreement to arbitrate exists.
3. Courts are given jurisdiction to stay litigation when one party to an arbitrable
dispute attempts to take it to court instead of arbitrating.
4. Courts are authorized to appoint arbitrators where the parties fail to provide a
method for appointment.
5. Majority action by arbitration boards is authorized.
6. Provision is made for oath by the arbitrator and/or witnesses, unless waived by
the parties.
7. Default proceedings (in the absence of a party) are authorized under certain
circumstances.
8. Provision is made for continuances and adjournments of hearings.
9. Limitation is placed upon the effect of waivers of the right to be represented by
counsel.
10. Arbitrators are given the subpoena power.
11. Awards are required to be in writing and signed by the arbitrator, and some
limitation is stated regarding the time within which awards mist be rendered.
12. Arbitrators are granted limited authority to modify or correct awards upon
timely application by a party, and the Uniform Act additionally permits the arbitra-
tor to clarify his award by application from a party.
13. A summary procedure is provided for (1) court confirmation of awards,
(2) court vacation of awards on limited grounds stated by the statute, (3) court mod-
ification or correction of awards on limited grounds stated by the statute.
14. Courts are authorized to enter judgment upon awards as confirmed, modified,
or corrected; the judgment is then enforceable as any other judgment.
15. Provision is made for appeals from court orders and judgments under the
statute.
ELKOURI, supra note 5, at 38-39. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE: §§ 1280-1295 (West 1982 &
Supp. 1985); N.Y. CIv PROC. LAW §§ 7501-7514 (McKinney 1980 & Supp. 1985).
13. Big Vein Pocahontas Co. v. Browning, 137 Va. 34, 120 S.E. 247 (1923) (a contract to
submit future differences to arbitration is not binding); M. BusS, COMMON LAW & STATU-
TORY PLEADING AND PRACTICE § 12 (4th ed. 1952).
14. See Condon v. South Side R.R. Co., 55 Va. (14 Gratt.) 484 (1858); Daughtrey, supra
note 11.
15. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-577 (Repl. Vol. 1984). That section reads in part. "Submission
of any claim or controversy to arbitration pursuant to such agreement shall be a condition
precedent to institution of suit or action thereon, and the agreement to arbitrate shall be
enforceable . .. ."
16. ELKOURI, supra note 5, at 10, 26-44; see also Virginia Beach Bd. of Realtors, Inc. v.
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when one of the contracting parties challenges the arbitrability of the
subject of the dispute'7 or protests the arbitrator's award.'8
When a party challenges the arbitrability of the subject, a court must
determine if the parties intended the issue to be included in their arbitra-
tion agreement.'" If a court finds that the parties designed their agree-
ment to include the particular controversy, the arbitration provision will
be upheld unless it violates public policy.20
There are several grounds upon which a party can attack the arbitra-
tor's award. An arbitration award may be set aside in Virginia if it ap-
pears on its face to be totally unfounded or is clearly illegal.2' Virginia
Code section 8.01-580 enumerates several specific grounds for setting
aside an award, including fraud, mistake, corruption, partiality or miscon-
duct of the arbitrators.22 If a party simply refuses to comply with a valid
arbitration agreement, a court can order the arbitration process to pro-
ceed as if the party had cooperated.23 Similar provisions can be found in
other states' arbitration statutes.
2 4
Goodman Segar Hogan, Inc., 224 Va. 659, 299 S.E.2d 360 (1983) (recognizing that since the
arbitration award is the decision of a judge of the parties' own choosing, it should be favora-
bly viewed by the courts).
17. For a detailed analysis of how and by whom arbitrability may be challenged see
ELKOURI, supra note 5, at 169-81.
18. See, e.g., VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-580 (Repl. Vol. 1984) ("No such award shall be set
aside, except for errors apparent on its face, unless it appears to have been procured by
corruption or other undue means, or that there was partiality or misbehavior in the arbitra-
tors or umpires, or any of them . . ").
19. Comment, supra note 4, at 489. When parties have agreed to submit their disputes to
arbitration, it remains the province of the courts to decide the threshold issue of what dis-
putes are arbitrable. This is so because the extent of the duty to arbitrate at all is based
upon the initial contractual agreement between the parties. Doyle & Russell, Inc. v. Roa-
noke Hosp. Ass'n, 213 Va. 489, 494, 193 S.E.2d 662, 666 (1973); see also Comment, Arbitra-
tion Clauses in Separation Agreements, 19 WASH. & LEE L. RE V. 286, 288 (1962).
20. Comment, supra note 4, at 489-90; see also, Sterk, supra note 9.
21. Wyatt Realty Enters., Ltd. v. Bob Jones Realty Co., 222 Va. 365, 367, 282 S.E.2d 8, 9
(1981) ("Absent corruption or undue means on the part of arbitrators, the sole statutory
bases for setting aside an arbitration award is for errors apparent on the award's face.");
Martin v. Winston, 181 Va. 94, 106, 23 S.E.2d 873, 878, cert. denied, 319 U.S. 766 (1943)
(every reasonable presumption will be indulged in support of arbitrators, and awards are not
to be set aside unless they are clearly illegal).
22. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-580 (Repl. Vol. 1984); see also United Paperworkers Int'l Union
v. Chase Bad Co., 222 Va. 324, 281 S.E.2d 807 (1981) (gross misbehavior or inattention by
the arbitrator is ground for setting aside an award); McKennie v. Charlottesville & A. Ry.,
110 Va. 70, 65 S.E. 503 (1909) (the reasons for setting aside an award must appear on its
face, or there must be misbehavior in the arbitrators, or some palpable mistake).
23. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-577(B) (Repl. Vol. 1984).
24. See, e.g., CAL. CIv. PROC. CODE §§ 1286-1286.8 (West 1982); N.Y. Civ. PROC. LAW §
7511 (McKinney 1980). According to ELKOUI, supra note 5,
The limited grounds for setting aside awards under many of the state statutes...
are along the following general lines, which differ little from the common law
grounds:
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Arbitrators are generally given "extremely broad and flexible" powers
over the disputes they moderate.25 They often may "disregard the law
entirely, and resolve disputes solely upon principles of equity and good
conscience." 26
B. Advantages of Arbitration
Arbitration, once viewed with judicial mistrust and skepticism, has be-
come increasingly embraced as "an effective and efficient method for
resolving disputes."2 Virginia courts consistently uphold agreements to
submit disputes to arbitration,28 thereby joining other state courts in ac-
knowledging the strong public policy considerations favoring the resolu-
tion of disputes through the arbitration process.29
The main advantage of arbitration over adjudication is that arbitration
affords parties the opportunity to promptly, privately, and less expen-
sively resolve their differences. Concurrently, arbitration provides judges
with substantial relief from overcrowded dockets,30 a problem which has
1. The award was procured by corruption, fraud, or other undue means.
2. The arbitrator was guilty of evident partiality, corruption, or misconduct
(some statutes expressly limit the impartiality requirement to neutrals).
3. The arbitrator refused to postpone the hearing upon sufficient cause shown, or
refused to hear material evidence; or otherwise so conducted the hearing as to
prejudice substantially the rights of a party.
4. The arbitrator exceeded his powers, or so imperfectly executed them that a
mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter submitted was not made.
5. There was no valid agreement to arbitrate (and it has not been determined
otherwise by an action to compel or stay arbitration), and objection to that fact was
properly raised.
Id. at 39-40 (footnotes omitted).
25. See, e.g., Swartz v. Swartz, 49 A.D.2d 254, -, 374 N.Y.S.2d 857, 860 (1975) (court
upheld arbitration provision for adjustment of alimony and acknowledged the broad and
flexible powers that arbitrators hold over controversies properly before them).
26. Moore v. Luckess, 64 Va. (23 Gratt.) 160 (1873).
27. See Sterk, supra note 9, at 482.
28. E.g., Virginia Beach Bd. of Realtors, Inc. v. Goodman Segar Hogan, Inc., 224 Va. 659,
299 S.E.2d 360 (1983) (an arbitration award, being the judgment of a "judge" of the parties'
own choosing ought to be favorably viewed by the courts, liberally construed, and upheld
whenever possible).
29. See, e.g., Riess v. Murchison, 384 F.2d 727, 734 (9th Cir. 1967) (public policy favors
arbitration agreements so as "to encourage persons who wish to avoid delays. . . [and] to
obtain adjustment of their differences by a tribunal of their own choosing") (citing Myers v.
Richfield Oil Corp., 98 Cal. App. 2d 667, 220 P.2d 973 (1950)); Nationwide Gen. Ins. Co. v.
Investors Ins. Co., 37 N.Y.2d 91, -, 332 N.E.2d 333, 335, 371 N.Y.S.2d 463, 466 (1975)
("[a]nnounced policy of [New York] favors and encourages arbitration as a means of con-
serving the time and resources of the courts and the contracting parties").
30. See generally 0. J. COOGLER, STRUCTURES MEDIATION IN DIVORCE SETLEMENT 71-72
(1978); Broderick, supra note 8, at 64 (recognizing arbitration as a viable means of combat-
ing mushrooming caseloads); Coalson, supra note 1, at 22-24 (recognizing the privacy and
cost-minimizing attractiveness of arbitration over adjudication); Note, Family Law-A Nod
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been recently augmented by a dramatic upsurge in marital separation and
divorce proceedings.3 1 One study has found that more than half of all trial
court cases deal with matrimonial actions. The reported statistics indi-
cated that during 1979 there were 1.2 million divorces in the country,
subjecting over two million adults and nearly 1.5 million children to the
trauma of a failed marriage.3 2 Judicial delays often compound the frustra-
tion that families must endure during their break ups; "delays of nine to
ten months are common for no-fault divorces, and contested divorces
often have to wait a year or two to be scheduled."33
Judges are required to assimilate and decide a number of matrimonial
cases every day. These cases are usually held within the public setting of
a courtroom, and are constantly subject to postponements and appeals."
Furthermore, some commentators seriously question the continued viabil-
ity of the adversarial system for resolving the often complex and private
issues raised in a family dissolution. 5
In contrast, arbitrators usually hear and decide only one case at a time.
They may focus their undivided attention on the parties, and offer more
flexibility in terms of scheduling hearings than do courts. Arbitration
hearings, once scheduled, are not as susceptible to delays and the often
stifling formality that accompanies a courtroom presentation. 6 Since the
divorcing spouses choose their own arbitrators and presumably help for-
mulate the final award, commentators suggest that the parties have a
much greater incentive to abide by the terms of their settlement.37 Fi-
nally, arbitration is viewed as a more sensitive method of dispute resolu-
tion-it deemphasizes the adversarial aspects of a separation or divorce,
and minimizes the intense polarization and traumatic impact that flow
from marital litigation.38
to "Judges of the Parties' Own Choosing," 4 CAMPBEL L. REv. 203 (1981) (outlining advan-
tages of resolving sensitive matters in a private and more informal setting chosen by the
parties' judges).
31. Pearson & Thoennes, Mediating and Litigating Disputes: A Longitudinal Evalua-
tion, 17 FAM. L.Q. 497, 497 (1984).
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. 0. J. COOGLER, supra note 30, at 71-72 (in court the practice is to schedule more cases
than can be heard, resulting in continual delays).
35. See generally Spencer & Zammit, Mediation-Arbitration: A Proposal for Private Res-
olution of Disputes Between Divorced or Separated Parents, 1976 DUKE L.J. 911. Family
counseling professionals are often encouraged to utilize the arbitration process in resolving
family disputes. See Spencer & Zammit, supra note 5, at 112.
36. O.J. COOGLER, supra note 30, at 71-72.
37. See generally Meroney, supra note 7. For a detailed analysis of the mechanisms in-
volved in selecting arbitrators, arbitration procedure and techniques, as well as standards
utilized in the arbitration process for interpreting the parties' arbitration contract, see
ELKOURI, supra note 5.
38. See generally Phear, supra note 7, at 23 (adjudication "is not well suited to resolving
disputes that arise from complex and reciprocal relationships in which there is no clear right
1985]
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C. Disadvantages of Arbitration
Perhaps the most criticized aspect of the arbitration process is that ar-
bitrators are not bound by rules of law or evidence.39 Although the arbi-
trability of the disputed subject, as well as the award, may ultimately be
challenged in court, arbitrators are only bound to resolve the dispute be-
tween the parties fairly.40 Consequently, the judicial rules that ensure the
veracity of evidence are not required in the arbitration process. Although
most arbitration awards will equitably resolve the given dispute,41 there is
no guarantee that the arbitrator has not contravened some law or funda-
mental public policy of the state in reaching a decision.42 Finally, some
courts have questioned the qualifications of arbitrators to decide domes-
tic disputes in general, and have particularly stressed the myriad intangi-
ble elements which the judiciary has to consider in settling child support,
custody and visitation issues.
43
Advantages and disadvantages aside, there is certainly a growing public
or wrong").
39. See generally Sterk, supra note 9, at 490-91 (arbitrators are not bound by private law
of jurisdiction most closely associated with the dispute); Comment, supra note 4, at 492
(parties submitting to arbitration are removed from the judicial protections of precedent
and the court's procedural rules designed to guarantee truth).
It has generally been the practice of most arbitrators to liberally allow evidence during
their hearings. Although the disputing parties may specifically require that the Rules of
Evidence be followed, such a request is rarely made. In fact, parties which arbitrate under
the rules of the American Arbitration Association are subject to the AAA procedures which
grant the individual arbitrator broad discretion in determining the relevancy and material-
ity of the evidence offered. Such broad discretion vested in the arbitrator has been the gen-
eral practice of both the common law and state statutes which deal with arbitration.
ELKOURI, supra note 5, at 252-56.
For a detailed and authoritative analysis on the use and admissibility of evidence in arbi-
tration procedures, see ELKOURI, supra note 5, at 252-95.
Other authors have articulated two schools of thought as to how to resolve this problem of
evidence. One view argues that arbitrators may conduct their hearings with a "common
sense" notion of what is important to a case, and thus liberally allow evidence offered by the
parties. The second, more restrictive, view is that the arbitrator, while not specifically bound
by federal or state rules of evidence, should nevertheless make their evidentiary decisions
consistent with these rules. M. HILL & A. V. SINECRoPr, EVIDENCE IN ARBrrRATION 1-3 (1981).
40. See supra text accompanying notes 19-26. Arbitrators, while acting in their official
arbitral capacity, are immune from civil liability. ELKOURI, supra note 5, at 95. Arbitrators
are nevertheless accountable for their actions. Arbitrators who demonstrate an inability to
equitably, efficiently and justly resolve disputes before them will soon become unacceptable
to future parties seeking arbitration, their own peers and the appointing agency. Id. at 96.
As to the background, training, qualifications, integrity and effectiveness of arbitrators, see
id. at 90-97.
41. Since the parties arbitrate voluntarily, prompt compliance with the award is obtained
in most cases. Courts are seldom petitioned to enforce or vacate awards. Id. at 10.
42. Sterk, supra note 9, at 490-92.
43. Nestel v. Nestel, 38 A.D.2d 942, -, 331 N.Y.S.2d 241, 243 (1972); accord Agur v.
Agur, 32 A.D.2d 16, -, 298 N.Y.S.2d 772, 777 n.4, 778 (1969).
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utilization of arbitration. In recognition of this trend, statistics indicate
an increasing number of state legislatures broadening the flexibility and
enforceability of their arbitration statutes,"" and a growing number of
cases favoring the enforceability of the arbitration process in domestic
disputes. 45 Under the Virginia arbitration statutes, parties may agree in
writing to submit to arbitration "any controversy" existing between them
or make arbitration a condition precedent to court action.46 Since the Vir-
ginia General Assembly did not exempt domestic relations disputes from
coverage by these arbitration laws, it appears that the legislature does not
view the arbitration of such disputes as against Virginia's public policy.
47
However, this issue has not been fully litigated in Virginia. Because of the
growing popularity of arbitration agreements in marital dispute resolu-
tions, the question of whether Virginia courts will enforce arbitration
clauses in separation agreements under the state's arbitration statutes, or
void such clauses as contrary to public policy, is ripe for adjudication.
II. ANALYSIS: ARBITRATION CLAUSES IN MARITAL SEPARATION
AGREEMENTS-FORMULATING A VIRGINIA PLAN
Although the Virginia Supreme Court has yet to review the issue,"4
other states have adopted positions on the enforceability of arbitration
between divorcing spouses.4' Consequently, this comment will analyze the
relevant Virginia statutes and cases, while incorporating the views of the
other states as persuasive authority, in order to formulate the likely Vir-
44. See ELKOURI, supra note 5, at 35-41.
45. See supra notes 2-3.
46. VA. CoDE ANN. § 8.01-577 (Repl. VoL 1984).
47. Cf. Crutchley v. Crutchley, 306 N.C. 518, _-, 293 S.E.2d 793, 796 (1982). ("Since the
Legislature did not exempt domestic relations disputes from coverage by the Act, we find no
legislative expression therein that arbitration of such disputes is against public policy.")
(discussing North Carolina Law).
48. While the Virginia Supreme Court has not, some lower courts have. The Nineteenth
Judicial Circuit found that an arbitration clause in a separation agreement is enforceable.
Blankespoor v. Blankespoor, No. 76995, slip op. at 1 (Fairfax County, Va. Sept. 20, 1983).
However, the decision is of dubious precedential value since the court summarily accepted
the arbitration clause without considering the issues. The bulk of the opinion reads:
I find that the arbitration clause applies to all matters of controversy between the
parties under the agreement, including those relative to the children.
There is nothing in the agreement itself to indicate that the parties intended to
except matters relating to the children from the arbitration requirement. No law is
cited and none is found which prohibits child welfare matters being the subject of
arbitration. Indeed, in the informal setting of mediation and arbitration it is certainly
just as likely, if not more likely, that the welfare of the children will be protected
more fairly than in the more formal courtroom setting. In any event, the Court of
equity retains jurisdiction to review any award, so the Court is not divested of is [sic]
ultimate responsibility for the welfare of the children.
Id. (emphasis added).
49. See supra note 2.
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ginia response to the use of arbitration in domestic controversies.
Most disputes arising under separation agreements may -be categorized
under five main headings: property settlement, spousal support, child
support, child custody and visitation. Although some commentators have
separately analyzed each of these areas,51 the most recent cases51 have
more broadly focused their inquiry into two distinct levels: (1) those dis-
putes concerning the resolution of property rights between the divorcing
spouses (property settlement and spousal support),52 and (2) those dis-
putes which more directly affect the children of a dissolving marriage
(child support, child custody and visitation rights).5 3 The reasoning for
this broader, two-level analysis is that the resolution of disputes concern-
ing property rights are often viewed by courts as a contractual area in
which adults should be allowed wide discretion to privately settle their
differences; 54 while the child related matters are fraught with public con-
cern, and traditionally safeguarded by the state.55
A. Property Settlements and Spousal Support
This part of the analysis focuses on the enforceability of an arbitration
provision in a separation agreement which requires that any dispute aris-
ing between the parties concerning the distribution of property or of
spousal support must be arbitrated as a condition precedent to court ac-
tion. These arbitration clauses have generally been upheld in other juris-
dictions5" and Virginia law strongly supports the enforceability of such
agreements.5 7
The jurisdictions which have reviewed this issue have cited a number of
policy considerations in upholding the validity of arbitration in the
50. See Comment, supra note 4.
51. See Faherty v. Faherty, 97 N.J. 99, 477 A.2d 1257 (1984); Crutchley v. Crutchley, 306
N.C. 518, 293 S.E.2d 793 (1982).
52. An argument can certainly be made that the resolution of property rights and of
spousal support affects the children of a divorce. Nevertheless, courts have analyzed these
matters separately from those areas which are perceived as directly adjusting the rights of
children, i.e., child support and custody. See cases cited supra note 51.
53. The resolution of visitation rights is primarily a determination of the rights of parents
or other family members. Nevertheless, courts have treated this as a matter so important to
the children that it is not perceived as a matter which ought to be settled with the property
rights of the divorcing spouses. Rather, this is an area that has been consistently analyzed
with the other elements of child welfare; child support and custody. See cases cited infra
note 75. Virginia law appears to be consistent with this trend. Virginia Code sections 20-
107.1 and 20-107.3 deal with spousal support and property rights, respectively, while section
20-107.2 controls child support, custody and visitation. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-107.1 to 107.3
(Supp. 1984).
54. See infra text accompanying notes 56-70.
55. See infra text accompanying notes 71-78.
56. See supra note 2.
57. See infra text accompanying notes 58-70.
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"property rights" area. Many of these considerations are equally applica-
ble in Virginia. In general, each jurisdiction has recognized that the
claims of each spouse to property and support are, in fact, "property
rights"58 and that the parties may settle these rights and obligations by
valid contract.5" Similarly, in Virginia, divisions of property between
spouses, as well as any claims for support and maintenance, are rights
which may be settled, negotiated or waived by valid contract arrange-
ments.60 Further, Virginia law permits a divorcing couple to execute a
separation agreement regulating post-divorce disposition of property or
other matters.61 Such property settlements entered into by competent
parties upon valid consideration will be enforced "unless their illegality is
clear and certain."62 There seems no valid reason, then, for denying di-
vorcing spouses the option of submitting their property disputes to an
arbitrator.
A second public policy consideration is that property division and
spousal support are sensitive and intensely private areas of domestic dis-
putes. In order to facilitate just and speedy resolution of these disputes,
public policy strongly supports the use of private contracts betwen the
parties regarding these areas. 63 The Virginia Supreme Court has recog-
nized that upon the failure of a marriage, public policy strongly favors the
prompt resolution of disputes concerning the property rights of the par-
ties.6 The Virginia court has stated that voluntary agreements certainly
promote prompt dispute resolution and thus "should be encouraged.
6 5
Moreover, each jurisdiction which has ruled on the matter has advo-
cated the use of arbitration in settling marital disputes over property
rights and acknowledged the process as an increasingly favored remedy to
formal litigation. 6  This favored use of arbitration has been continually
affirmed by the Virginia judiciary. Recently, the Virginia Supreme Court
acknowledged that an arbitration award, "being the judgment of a judge
of the parties' own choosing, ought to be favorably viewed by the courts;
and effect ought to be given [to the award] whenever it can be done con-
sistently with the rules of law."16 7
58. See, e.g., Schlemm v. Schlemm, 31 N.J. 557, 158 A.2d 508 (1960); Schukal v. Schukal,
55 Misc. 2d 120, 284 N.Y.S.2d 534 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1967).
59. Kunker v. Kunker, 230 A.D. 641, -, 246 N.Y.S. 118, 121 (1930); Kiger v. Kiger, 258
N.C. 126, 128-29, 128 S.E.2d 235, 237 (1962); see also Comment, supra note 4, at 496-99 (as
a property right, spousal support is a proper subject of contract).
60. Chapman v. Chapman, 20 Bankr. 810, 812-13 (E.D. Va. 1982).
61. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-109 to 109.1 (Cum. Supp. 1984).
62. Capps v. Capps, 216 Va. 378, 380, 219 S.E.2d 901, 903 (1975).
63. Faherty v. Faherty, 97 N.J. 99, -, 477 A.2d 1257, 1262 (1984).
64. Morris v. Morris, 216 Va. 457, 459, 219 S.E.2d 864, 867 (1975).
65. Id. at 459, 219 S.E.2d at 866.
66. Faherty, 97 N.J. at _, 477 A.2d at 1261-62; Crutchley v. Crutchley, 306 N.C. 518,
-, 293 S.E.2d 793, 796-97 (1982).
67. Virginia Beach Bd. of Realtors, Inc. v. Goodman Segar Hogan, Inc., 224 Va. 659, 662,
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Finally, other jurisdictions have ruled that if arbitration is expressly
adopted by the parties as their preferred method of distributing property
and support, such a choice is not only judicially enforceable, but "highly
desirable. ' 68 Virginia courts have yet to adopt such unequivocal language,
but it is clear that public policy favors the private resolution of property
rights and spousal support arrangements. Accordingly, it should be left to
the parties to decide whether they would rather negotiate, adjudicate or
arbitrate their differences.
Virginia appears to be on the threshold of upholding clauses in separa-
tion agreements which provide for the arbitration of property rights and
spousal support. Several commentators have observed that Virginia has
recently taken a more progressive view of contracts relating to the adjust-
ment of property rights between spouses.6 9 This is indicative of the gen-
eral trend towards granting divorcing adults a more voluntary and auton-
omous rule in effectuating a prompt resolution of disputes concerning
their property rights.7 0 The Virginia judiciary is likely to continue this
trend by upholding the enforceability of arbitration clauses in separation
agreements which control the distribution of property and spousal
support.
B. Child Support, Custody and Visitation
There is considerable debate as to whether public policy will allow par-
ents to conclusively resolve disputes concerning child support, child cus-
tody and visitation.7 ' As noted in the previous section, in disputes over
spousal support and property settlement, states have acknowledged the
broad discretion which divorcing spouses have to privately resolve their
controversies.7 2 One commentator suggests that since the resolution of
these property rights appears to be a matter which society is content to
leave to private agreement, there is no reason to prohibit the parties from
referring these contractual disputes to arbitration.7 3 Similarly, if public
policy will permit parties to privately and conclusively resolve debates
over child support, custody and visitation, there would be no reason to
prohibit the resolution of such disputes by arbitrators.7 4
299 S.E.2d 360, 362 (1983) (quoting Pollack's Adm'r v. Sutherlin, 66 Va. (25 Gratt.) 78, 80
(1874)).
68. Faherty, 97 N.J. at -, 477 A.2d at 1262.
69. See generally Note, Overview of Supreme Court Decisions on Domestic Relations
1970-1980, 15 U. RICH. L. REv. 321, 342-44 (1981) [hereinafter cited as Overview on Domestic
Relations]; Note, Domestic Relations, 64 VA. L. REv. 1439, 1447 (1978) [hereinafter cited as
Domestic Relations].
70. Domestic Relations, supra note 69, at 1447.
71. See, e.g., Sterk, supra note 9, at 494.
72. See supra text accompanying notes 56-70.
73. Sterk, supra note 9, at 494.
74. Id.
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Courts that have reviewed this issue have recognized two major charac-
teristics which distinguish the resolution of these child-related matters
from settling property and spousal support controversies.7 5 First, in the
distribution of property and support between divorcing spouses, the par-
ents are allocating their own rights.76 However, in child support, custody
and visitation matters, it is primarily the rights of the children that are
affected.7 7 Second, because of the doctrine of parens patriae, states have
retained a substantial role in protecting the best interests of children. 78
Despite these factors, there has been a growing tendency to enforce ar-
bitration agreements regarding child support, custody and visitation dis-
putes.7 1 However, courts are presently unwilling to completely abdicate
their special supervisory role in protecting the best interests of the child.
In reviewing the enforceability of such arbitration agreements, courts are
divided along a continuum which, at one end, recognizes the efficiency
and multiple benefits offered by arbitration and would readily uphold ar-
bitration awards dealing with "child related" matters; on the opposite
end, traditional parens patriae notions reign with the court, not an arbi-
trator, being viewed as best suited to determine child support, custody
and visitation issues.8s
Three views exemplify the positions adopted by courts which have ad-
dressed the enforceability of arbitration agreements affecting "child re-
lated" matters.$" First, there is an extreme minority "pro-arbitration"
75. See Faherty v. Faherty, 97 N.J. 99, 477 A.2d 1257 (1984); Agur v. Agur, 32 A.D.2d 16,
298 N.Y.S.2d 772 (1969); Schneider v. Schneider, 17 N.Y.2d 123, 216 N.E.2d 318, 269
N.Y.S.2d 107 (1966); Crutchley v. Crutchley, 306 N.C. 518, 293 S.E.2d 793 (1982).
76. See supra note 52.
77. See supra note 47.
78. In early common law there developed a strong presumption that infants should be
protected by the courts, and the chancellor was given power as the ultimate guardian and
protector of children. Note, New York Court Approves Use of Arbitration in Custody Dis-
putes, 33 FORDHAm L. REv. 726, 727 (1965). In the words of Lord Esher in Queen v. Gyngall,
"The court is placed in a position by reason of the prerogative of the crown to act as su-
preme parent of children, and must exercise that jurisdiction in the manner in which a wise,
affectionate and careful parent would act for the welfare of the child." Id. at 727 (quoting
Queen v. Gyngall [1893] 2 Q.B. 232). The doctrine of protecting the best interests of the
child was formulated in the United States by Judge Cardozo in his opinion in Finlay v.
Finlay, 240 N.Y. 429, 148 N.E. 624 (1925).
79. See infra text accompanying notes 82-85. It has been easier for some courts to uphold
the enforceability of arbitration clauses where child support is concerned. See Schneider, 17
N.Y.2d 123, 216 N.E.2d 318, 269 N.Y.S.2d 107. However, the two most recent cases in this
area from other jurisdictions have treated child support, custody and visitation as suffi-
ciently related so as to be jointly analyzed. See Faherty, 97 N.J. at _, 477 A.2d at 1263;
Crutchley, 306 N.C. at -, 293 S.E.2d at 798.
80. See infra text accompanying notes 81-89.
81. There is arguably a fourth view. There are those who support the complete abdication
by the courts of their parens patriae role in favor of arbitrators chosen by the parties or
child custody committees. Comment, supra note 4, at 504 nn.151-56. However, there is no
case law which would support this option in the foreseeable future.
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outlook adopted by the North Carolina Supreme Court. The majority of
courts favor a strictly "pro-court" or "pro-parens patriae" view. Finally,
a new compromise position, first adopted by New Jersey courts, allows
parents a more private and autonomous role in the resolution of their
domestic disputes, while at the same time providing necessary protection
to the interests of the children. This compromise view appears most con-
sistent with Virginia statutory and case law, and is arguably the position
that the Virginia judiciary should adopt when reviewing the enforceabil-
ity of arbitration clauses which seek to govern child support, custody and
visitation issues.
1. The "Pro-Arbitration" View
The case of Crutchley v. Crutchleys2 is the only state supreme court
case which has adopted the "pro-parental choice" or "pro-arbitration"
viewpoint. The court in Crutchley held that, "the amount of child sup-
port agreed on by parties to a separation agreement is presumed, in the
absence of contrary evidence, to be just and reasonable.'s 3 Therefore, al-
though the opinion asserts that the provisions of a separation agreement
concerning child welfare matters will always be reviewable and modifiable
by the judiciary, the court grants a presumption of validity to separation
agreements.8 4 The court subsequently implies that an arbitration award
concerning child custody is similarly presumed just and reasonable. "5
Hence, the burden rests on the party challenging the arbitration to show
cause why the award should be invalidated.
2. The "Pro-Court" View
Representing the other extreme, as well as the majority position, de-
fenders of the judicial system argue that allowing the parties or arbitra-
tors to decide these child related matters is a dangerous and unjustifiable
encroachment on court authority."8 A leading New York appellate case,
Agur v. Agur,s7 strongly emphasized the historical role which courts have
held as parens patriae, and concluded that, "the judicial process is more
broadly gauged and better suited to reach [a just determination]" '8 than
82. 306 N.C. 518, 293 S.E.2d 793 (1982).
83. Id. at -' 293 S.E.2d at 797.
84. Id.
85. Id. at -, 293 S.E.2d at 798. For a very influential case which basically has an identi-
cal holding to Crutchley, see Sheets v. Sheets, 22 A.D.2d 176, 254 N.Y.S.2d 320 (1964).
86. See Holman & Noland, Agreement and Arbitration: Relief to Over-Litigation in Do-
mestic Relations Disputes in Washington, 12 WELLAmErrE L.J. 527, 537 (1976); see also
Sterk, supra note 9.
87. 32 A.D.2d 16, 298 N.Y.S.2d 772 (1969).




is arbitration. One commentator criticizes the arbitration process as being
overly concerned with justice between the divorcing spouses, while ignor-
ing the paramount issue in all child support, custody and visitation dis-
putes-the best interests of the children.89 Thus, unlike the "pro-arbitra-
tion" view which grants a presumption of validity to arbitration awards,
this view would completely ignore any arbitration award dealing with
child support, custody or visitation. As soon as an interested party raises
an objection to the award and challenges the arbitrator's decision before a
court, the judiciary would conduct a de novo review.
3. The Faherty Compromise
A compromise position has recently been recognized by the Supreme
Court of New Jersey in Faherty v. Faherty.90 The court evaluated the
growing use of arbitration in the domestic area and could find "no valid
reason why the arbitration process should not be available in the area of
child support [custody and visitation].""1 Nevertheless, the court recog-
nized that the judiciary carries "a nondelegable, special supervisory func-
tion [in these areas]." 92 The Faherty court thus adopted a compromise
position which is more "pro-court" than Crutchley, and more "pro-arbi-
tration" than Agur. 3 The Faherty court places the initial burden of chal-
lenging the arbitrator's decision on the party seeking to overturn the
award. If no challenge is made, the award stands.94 Once the award is
challenged, however, the burden of showing that the award could not "ac-
tually and materially" adversely affect the child's standard of living then
falls upon the supporters of the arbitration award.9 5 Should the support-
ers of the award fail to make the showing, the trial court may then con-
duct a de novo review.96
The "pro-arbitration" view, which presumes the validity of an arbitra-
tor's award, initially places the burden of producing evidence on the party
challenging the award. That party also has the burden of overcoming the
award's presumption of validity. By contrast, under Faherty, the party
opposed to the arbitrator's decision need only raise a challenge in court.
Once he does this, the burden, shifts to the supporters of the award to
show that the award will not have an adverse effect on the child.
Under the "pro-court" view, when confronted with any challenge to an
89. See generally Sterk, supra note 9, at 489-93.
90. 97 N.J. 99, 477 A.2d 1257 (1984).
91. Id. at -, 477 A.2d at 1262-63. The court states that the policy reasons for its holding
with respect to child support may be equally applicable to custody and visitation cases. Id.
92. Id. at -, 477 A.2d at 1263.
93. See supra text accompanying notes 82-89.
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arbitration decision, the judiciary will simply ignore the award and con-
duct a de novo trial. Under Faherty, if the proponents demonstrate that
the award is substantially in the child's best interests, judicial interven-
tion will terminate, and the award will stand.
4. A Virginia Plan
The Virginia judiciary has signified its willingness to uphold voluntary
agreements which more promptly resolve disputes concerning the prop-
erty rights of divorcing spouses.97 Moreover, the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia held in Morris v. Morris9s that the purpose of Virginia Code section
20-109.1 is to facilitate the enforceability of such separation agreements. 9
Virginia courts have also recognized the growing viability of arbitration,0 °
and joined the trend which encourages a more independent role for di-
vorcing couples in planning their future.101
The Virginia judiciary should therefore be persuaded by the theoretical
appeal of Faherty when dealing with arbitration agreement which resolve
"child-related" matters. Specifically, if all parties 0 2 are satisfied with an
arbitrator's award, there will be no challenges and the award should
stand. This analysis reflects the "pro-arbitration" portion of the Faherty
view. Accordingly, the benefits of efficiency, less burdensome court dock-
ets, and a more private and autonomous forum for parents will be real-
ized in the majority of cases, since most arbitration awards are unlikely to
be challenged. 103
Equally important to the viability of the Faherty analysis in Virginia is
the ability of the court to fulfill its duty as protector of the child's best
interests. The ultimate power of the court to review an arbitrator's award
appears to be a necessary prerequisite for Virginia's judicial acceptance of
the Faherty position. This is because the state courts' enthusiasm for ar-
bitration and parental autonomy, though strong,'0 4 is tempered by an af-
97. See supra notes 60-62 and accompanying text.
98. 216 Va. 457, 219 S.E.2d 864 (1975).
99. Id. at 459, 219 S.E.2d at 866-67. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-109.1 (Repl. Vol. 1983) provides
in relevant part: "Any court may affirm, ratify and incorporate by reference in its decree
... any valid agreement between the parties ... concerning the conditions of the mainte-
nance of the parties, or either of them and the care, custody and maintenance of their minor
children . .. ."
100. See supra text accompanying notes 58-70.
101. See Overview on Domestic Relations, supra note 69, at 342-44.
102. "Parties" to an arbitration award should arguably include any interested party, in-
cluding representatives of the children, parents, family members, probation officers and
public welfare representatives.
103. Since the parties arbitrate voluntarily, prompt compliance with the award is ob-
tained in most cases. Only infrequently is court action requested for the enforcement or
vacation of awards. ELKOURI, supra note 5, at 10.
104. See supra text accompanying notes 97-101.
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finity for the policy of parens patriae.
The Supreme Court of Virginia has stressed that in child related issues,
"[o]ur first and foremost concern. . . is the welfare of the child. All other
matters . ..must necessarily be subordinate." 105 Virginia Code section
20-107.2 grants the judiciary power to rule on such matters as the custody
and support of minor children, as well as the visitation rights of the par-
ents and other family members. 108 Virginia Code section 20-108107 gives
the divorce court continuing jurisdiction to change or modify its original
decree, "and a contract between husband and wife cannot prevent the
court from exercising this power."10 8 Although the Supreme Court of Vir-
ginia has underscored the need to respect the legal and contractual rights
of the parents, "the welfare of the child is to be regarded more highly
than the technical rights of the parent. When the interests of the child
demand it, the rights of the father and mother may be disregarded." 109
This strong language would initially appear to place Virginia in the cat-
egory of jurisdictions adopting the "pro-court" stance, at the expense of
arbitration agreements. However, while the court will disregard the arbi-
tration rights of the mother and father, it should do so only when the
interests of the child demand it. 110 This standard seems more closely as-
sociated with Faherty. By adopting the Faherty view, Virginia courts
may continue to oversee the welfare of children, while simultaneously em-
bracing the multiple benefits inherent in the arbitration process.
Under the Faherty rule, if any interested party raises a challenge to the
arbitrator's award, the burden of showing to the court that the award is
in the child's best interests falls upon the supporters of the award.,
Should the proponents fail to persuade the court, the court may then ex-
ercise its historic power as parens patriae and conduct a de novo trial.11 2
This analysis comports with present Virginia law. Specifically, when the
interests of the child are "actually and materially" threatened and de-
mand judicial intervention, then, and only then, should the arbitration
105. Brown v. Kettle, 225 Va. 451, 457, 303 S.E.2d 864, 868 (1983).
106. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.2 (Supp. 1984) provides in relevant part: "the court may
make such further decree as it shall deem expedient concerning the custody and support of
the minor children of the parties, and concerning visitation rights of the parents and...
other family members."
107. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-108 (Repl. Vol. 1983) provides in relevant part: "the court may
... revise and alter such decree concerning the care, custody and maintenance of the chil-
dren and make a new decree concerning the same, as the circumstances of the parents and
the benefit of the children may require."
108. Featherstone v. Brooks, 220 Va. 443, 446, 258 S.E.2d 513, 515 (1979).
109. Forbes v. Haney, 204 Va. 712, 716, 133 S.E.2d 533, 536 (1963).
110. Id.
111. Faherty v. Faherty, 97 N.J. 99, _, 477 A.2d 1257, 1263 (1984).
112. Id.
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rights of the father and mother be "disregarded.' ' 1 3
It is obvious that the Virginia judiciary values parental autonomy and
the arbitration process more highly than does the view exemplified by
Agur. It is equally evident that Virginia courts will not be inclined to
allow a blanket presumption of validity to arbitration awards which gov-
ern child welfare matters, as had the Crutchley court. Consequently, by
adopting the Faherty viewpoint, Virginia may continue its support of the
arbitration process as well as the trend towards granting divorcing par-
ents a more private and meaningful role in the resolution of their family
controversies. Simultaneously, the judiciary may retain its historic role as
guardian of the child's best interests by maintaining the court's ultimate
position as parens patriae. As summarized in the Faherty decision:
As we gain experience in the arbitration of child support and custody dis-
putes, it may become evident that a child's best interests are as well pro-
tected by an arbitrator as by a judge. If so, there would be no necessity for
our de novo review. However, because of the Court's parens patriae tradi-
tion, [there will be occasions when] we prefer to err in favor of the child's
best interest.' 14
III. CONCLUSION
Considering Virginia law, public policy, the multiple benefits inherent
in the arbitration process, and the persuasive authority of the positions
adopted by other jurisdictions, it is evident that arbitration clauses in
separation agreements should be judicially enforceable under the Virginia
arbitration statutes. Virginia policy favors the private resolution of prop-
erty rights and spousal support arrangements. Accordingly, it should be
left to the parties to decide whether they wish to arbitrate any disputes
which arise in these areas. Virginia law strongly supports the enforceabil-
ity of arbitration clauses in separation agreements which govern distribu-
tion of the property rights of divorcing adults.
In the areas of child support, custody and visitation, however, the law
is not so clearly delineated. There are courts which highly regard the ar-
bitration process and have granted arbitrators' decisions a presumption of
validity. Conversely, a number of courts and commentators have advo-
cated a stance which would basically ignore the arbitration process, and
leave all authority in the judiciary to review the child welfare issues. Fi-
nally, there is a compromise view, articulated in the Faherty decision,
which appears to be consistent with Virginia law. By adopting this com-
promise Faherty position, the Virginia judiciary may reaffirm its commit-
ment to the arbitration process and to parental autonomy, while retaining
113. See supra text accompanying note 109.
114. Faherty, 97 N.J. at -, 477 A.2d at 1263.
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the ability to assert its traditional role as guardian of the child's best
interests.
Antonio J. Calabrese

